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THE UBER EFFECT 
ABSTRACT 
Taxi industries across the world have been affected by a new trend in transportation; ridesharing services. It is 
suggested that this effect has been demonstrated through falling taxi medallion prices. This recent decline in taxi 
medallion prices has been coined the term “The Uber Effect”. This paper analyzes the effect that Uber has had on 
the taxi industry’s medallion prices since UberX has entered three different markets: New York City, Chicago and 
Philadelphia. The price of a taxi medallion is modeled against a variable of interest: number of Uber drivers in a 
city, and control variables: unemployment rate, long term interest rate and labor force population. Through 
individual city and panel regression analysis, The Uber Effect is tested and quantified. 
The key finding from this paper is that the number of Uber drivers in the market is negatively correlated with the 
price of a taxi medallion, as expected. It is statistically and economically significant; each additional Uber driver 
reduces the price of a taxi medallion by $22 to $45. Furthermore, the unemployment rate and labor force 
population variables are statistically significant in all cities used in this study.  
INTRODUCTION 
Taxi industries across the world have been highly regulated with minimal innovation over the past century. Many 
American cities still operate under a taxi medallion system. A taxi medallion is a permit for a vehicle to be used as a 
taxi. Cities that operate under this system limit the number of taxi medallions available. The goal of the medallion 
system is to control the supply of taxis in the market and to maintain an efficient amount of taxis. However, in 
many American cities there is an undersupply of taxis (Schaller, 2005). The limited supply of taxi medallions makes 
them a valuable asset, and from early 2000 until 2013 they have been seen as a great investment as shown by 
their skyrocketing price (Cumming, 2009). In recent years the price of a taxi medallion has been plummeting from a 
high of over $1,100,000 in New York City in November 2013 to $600,000 in July 2015 (NYC T&LC, 2016). It is 
expected that the cause of this drop in medallion price is due to the recent entry of ridesharing companies (Barro, 
2014). Ridesharing has disrupted the taxi industries in cities across the world, with the most well-known disruptor 
being Uber. This study will discover if conventional wisdom is correct; if Uber is causing taxi medallion prices to 
drop. 
The hypothesis is that the dropping price of taxi medallions is due to Uber’s entry to the market; the number of 
active Uber drivers in the market is statistically significant in determining the price of a taxi medallion with a 
negative coefficient. 
Uber is considered a technology company that simply connects people. Uber connects individuals needing to be 
driven from point A to point B (riders) with individuals who are available to drive customers (driver partners) 
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through a smartphone application (Nilsen, 2015). There are many different services Uber offers, however the 
service that stirs up the most controversy is UberX (Elliot, 2014). This service receives the most pushback from the 
taxi industry because it is a nearly perfect substitute service to a taxi, but it offers the service at a lower price. 
UberX can charge lower fares because it bypasses taxi industry regulations, such as buying a taxi medallion (Castle, 
2015) and insurance requirements (Appel, 2015), which also leaves Uber’s operations in a legal gray area. The 
UberX service essentially allows any person with a clean background check and a vehicle in good condition to act 
as a taxi driver (Castle, 2015). 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This research can be considered an extension of Dan Cumming’s Paper “Why has the Price of Taxi Medallions 
Increased So Dramatically? An Analysis of the Taxi Medallion Market”. The research analyzes the price of a New 
York City taxi medallion from 1976 to 2007. This paper contributes great insight for understanding what causes the 
fluctuation in taxi medallion prices, however it only analyzes data up to 2007 and misses the entry of Uber., 
Cumming’s research used annual data while this research uses monthly data for the analysis. Additionally, this 
research paper includes an analysis of Chicago and Philadelphia, not just New York City. This paper utilizes 
Cumming’s research paper and variables found within it as a base reference. The key finding of Cumming’s 
research is that the economic health of a city is a key determinant in the price of a taxi medallion. In his study, this 
was represented by New York City’s unemployment rate. This is expanded on by adding new variables, with Uber 
driver data being the variable of interest.  
The paper “Elasticities for taxicab fares and service availability” by Bruce Schaller examines the change in trip 
demand with change in taxi fares. This paper concluded that as taxi fares increase, trip demand decreases but 
overall taxi drivers earned more revenue with a fare increase (Schaller, 1998). This should in turn increase the 
value of a taxi medallion. However, this study focused on the years of 1990 to 1996, prior to Uber’s entry. A taxi 
fare increase would likely reduce the overall revenue of the taxi industry with Uber in the market. Prior to Uber’s 
entry, individuals did not have an alternative and if they needed a ride, they had to use a taxi. Now they can 
choose Uber as a less expensive alternative, therefore taxi fares are not included in the study. 
The paper “A Regression Model of the Number of Taxicabs in U.S. Cities” by Bruce Schaller models the number of 
cabs in 118 American cities modeled by a variety of determinants of taxi demand. This paper shows certain 
demand factors that can affect the value of a taxi medallion. It demonstrates the importance of an efficient 
amount of taxis to prevent an undersupply or oversupply. Uber does not control the number of Uber driver 
partners in the market, disrupting the equilibrium. 
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CONTRIBUTION 
The research conducted in this study is the first of its kind and quantifies the effect Uber has had economically on 
the taxi industry. It presents insight into how Uber has affected the price of a taxi medallion since their entry to the 
market. This paper also provides insight on other independent variables that are significant in determining the 
price of a taxi medallion. The implications from this paper are that if the taxi industry does not adapt, or if 
regulations for ridesharing services aren’t implemented in a timely manner, the taxi industry will continue to 
struggle and could eventually collapse. Driver partners are growing exponentially and Uber continues to capture 
market share from the taxi industry. For cities that have not yet adopted or created new regulations for 
ridesharing companies, this paper provides insight on the impact of ridesharing on existing taxi services. In addition 
to the taxi industry, this paper demonstrates the effect that the new “sharing” economy can have on existing 
industries. 
ECONOMICS OF TOPIC 
The underlying economics behind changing taxi medallion prices is demonstrated by changes in demand variables. 
For example, it is expected that an increase in the number of Uber drivers will decrease the demand for a taxi 
service, thereby decreasing the price of a taxi medallion. This is done by increasing the supply of Uber vehicles 
available, a (nearly perfect) substitute service to taxis. Figure 1 illustrates how a demand shift works (Cumming, 
2009). The shift in demand from D1 to D2 can be explained by a decrease in the number of active Uber drivers. 
This demonstrates that an increase in demand will increase the price of a taxi medallion, shifting from P1 to P2. 
The supply does not move in this model because the taxi medallion system fixes the supply of taxis in the market. 
FIGURE 1: SUPPLY AND Demand OF TAXI MEDALLIONS  
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DATA 
The following section details the data used in this analysis. It reviews each variable used, the data source and 
retrieval method. Each variable used is in terms of monthly data, spanning a time period of 71 months starting in 
May 2009. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
VALUE OF A TAXI MEDALLION 
The value of a taxi medallion is the market value of a taxi medallion in USD being sold in a regulated secondary 
marketplace. Given that less than 6 years of data is used, adjusting for inflation would not produce a material 
difference in the results, therefore these values are not adjusted for inflation. The New York City data was sourced 
from the New York City government website, specifically from the Taxi and Limousine Commission section. The 
Chicago data was sourced from the Chicago Dispatcher website. Philadelphia’s data was sourced from the 
Philadelphia Parking Authority. 
The data was available in monthly figures in PDF documents for New York City and Chicago, and in hard copy paper 
format for Philadelphia. These documents listed every medallion transfer that occurred in the given month. To 
obtain the market value of the medallion, monthly average market values were calculated. This was done by taking 
the total sum of medallion sales divided by the number of medallion sales in a given month. Values below 
$100,000 were omitted for New York City and Philadelphia, and values below $70,000 were omitted for Chicago, 
as they were outliers and do not accurately reflect the value of a taxi medallion. The outlier values typically 
represented a transfer between family members, or in some cases, legal disputes. If there were no taxi medallion 
sales in a given month, the previous month’s average was applied.  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE OF INTEREST 
NUMBER OF UBER DRIVERS 
The number of Uber drivers is the number of active UberX and UberBLACK drivers in a given city. An active driver 
means the driver has provided at least one Uber ride in the given month.  
Private technology companies’ data is an extremely valuable resource that they want to keep internal. For this 
reason, finding data on number of Uber drivers was extremely difficult. The data was sourced from a graph in a 
working paper titled “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States” by Jonathan 
V. Hall and Alan B. Krueger at Princeton University. The data was collected using a software program called Web 
Plot Digitizer. This software extracted the data by importing a photo of the graph of number of Uber drivers over 
time from the working paper, calibrating the X and Y axis to create a grid where each pixel is a different data point, 
and manually selecting data points from the graph. Once all desired data points were selected, the data was 
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exported. This process was repeated 10 times per city to ensure robust data, using the average number of drivers 
across all 10 data selection trials in analysis. Using this graph and software, the number of Uber Drivers since the 
launch of UberX were collected totaling 31 months for New York City and Chicago, and 30 months for Philadelphia. 
A drawback of this data is that it does not capture any months in 2016 and misses most months in 2015. These 
months exhibited further dropping taxi medallion values, and for this reason, the magnitude of the effect of the 
number of active Uber drivers may be underestimated in this study. 
INDEPENDENT CONTROL VARIABLES 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  
The unemployment rate numbers used for Chicago are the Chicago-Naperville-Eglin metropolitan area. The 
numbers used for New York City represent the New York-Jersey City-White Plains metropolitan area. The 
unemployment rate values used for Philadelphia are for the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington metropolitan area. 
A city’s unemployment rate is an indicator of the economic health of the individual city. It is expected that as the 
unemployment rate increases, the price of a taxi medallion will decrease because of the decrease in local 
economic health. This data was sourced from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
LONG TERM INTEREST RATES 
The long term interest rate is the rate of government bonds maturing in ten years. These interest rates are the 
prices government bonds trade for on financial markets, not the interest rates the loans were issued at. These 
values better indicate the financial health across the entire country, and the values are the same for all cities. It is 
expected that as the long term interest rate increases, the price of a taxi medallion will decrease because of the 
decrease in nationwide economic health. This data was sourced from the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
(OECD).  
LABOR FORCE POPULATION 
The same metropolitan areas as unemployment rate were used to maintain consistency. This number captures 
increasing market size and increasing need for the transportation service within a given city. It is expected that an 
increase in labor force population increases demand for a taxi service, increasing the price of a taxi medallion. This 
data was sourced from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor force population was selected instead of the total 
population because individuals who are a part of the labor force are more likely to use a taxi service.  
Exhibits 1 through 4 contain further details on the data used including the mean, maxima, minima, standard 
deviation, number of observations, trends and histograms of the data. 
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EMPIRICAL MODEL AND STRATEGY 
Past literature by Dan Cumming’s performed a time series ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to test 
the significance of independent variables in determining the value of a taxi medallion. To see if this methodology 
was suitable for this analysis, unit root tests to test for stationarity in all three different cities were conducted. A 
Dickey Fuller test was conducted for each city on the value of a taxi medallion, with results shown in Exhibit 5. 
These tests showed mixed results: a p-value of 0.0426, 0.3366 and 0.8267 respectively for New York City, Chicago 
and Philadelphia. This demonstrates that New York City can reject the null hypothesis that the value of a taxi 
medallion follows a unit root process at a 95% confidence level, but Chicago and Philadelphia cannot. Since two of 
the three cities do not reject the null hypothesis, OLS was used for all cities to ensure consistency regarding 
regression methodology. 
INDIVIDUAL CITY TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
The following equation is used for individual city time series analysis: 
[1] 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
The left side of the equation is the dependent variable, value of a taxi medallion, represented by valmed by time 
(t=1, …, T). The right side of the equation includes independent variables used to determine the price of a taxi 
medallion. All four independent variables affect the demand curve in shifting the equilibrium price. These 
independent variables are time dependent where uberdriv, unemrate, ltintrate and laborforce are given by time 
(t=1, …, T). The error term used in this equation is the standard error term used in Stata’s OLS regression. 
FIXED EFFECTS PANEL ANALYSIS 
For the panel analysis, a fixed effects regression analysis is used. The initial equation with a fixed effect is: 
[2] 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +∝𝑖+ 𝛽1𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The fixed effects equation is formed by subtracting the mean of each variable from its individual values: 
[3] 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = ?̈?𝑖𝑡 
Through this process, the fixed effect is eliminated: 
 [4] ∝𝑖−∝̅𝑖= 0 
This process yields the final equation to be used in the regression analysis: 
[5] 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑑̈ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀?̈?𝑡 
The left side of the equation is the dependent variable, value of a taxi medallion, where valmed by time (t=1, …, T) 
and city (i=1,2,3). The right side of the equation includes all independent variables, where uberdriv, unemrate, 
ltintrate and laborforce are given by time (t=1, …, T) and city (i=1,2,3). The error term used in this equation is the 
standard error term used in Stata’s fixed effects regression. 
6 
 
Each variable is tested for statistical and economic significance in deciding whether it is a determinant of the value 
of a taxi medallion. The null hypothesis, H0, for each variable is: variable is not statistically or economically 
significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion. The alternative hypothesis, H1, for each variable is: variable 
is statistically and economically significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion. These hypotheses were 
tested for both individual city multiple regression analyses and the fixed effects regression analysis. A variable 
could be statistically significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion in one city, but not the other. The 
variables were tested at a 95% confidence level, accepting values that yield a p-value of less than 0.05 in the 
results of the multiple regression analysis. 
TESTING FOR NON-LINEARITY 
The relationship between taxi medallion prices and the number of Uber drivers could potentially be a non-linear 
relationship.  
Two new variables were created to test for non-linearity. The first, sqruberdriv, is equal to the number of active 
Uber drivers squared (uberdriv2). The second, sqrtuber, equals the square root of the number of active Uber 
drivers (uberdriv1/2). Two regression analyses were run, one including sqruberdriv and one including sqrtuber. 
These were included in a fixed effects regression using all three cities as a panel of data.  
The regression equations are: 
[6] 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑑̈ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀?̈?𝑡 
[7] 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑑̈ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀?̈?𝑡 
The linearity of the relationship was tested by looking at the statistical significance and sign of sqruberdriv and 
sqrtuber in their regressions, and by comparing the AIC values between the models. If either sqruberdriv or 
sqrtuber are statistically significant with the proper sign and the models yield a lower AIC value, meaning that the 
model is more parsimonious, then it is possible that the relationship in non-linear.  
Non-linearity could be the case for a few reasons. When Uber first enters a city, it is unlikely to be well known. This 
implies the impact that Uber drivers have would be very minimal, and there would not be a significant effect on 
the price of a taxi medallion. As Uber becomes more well known, the taxi industry faces a larger risk. It becomes 
apparent the taxi industry is losing market share and the number of Uber drivers is increasing quickly. At this stage 
the number of Uber drivers would have a very high impact on taxi medallion prices, this reflects an increasing 
elasticity from the number of Uber drivers. This relationship could also be non-linear if Uber has been in the 
market for a significant amount of time, and regulations have been implemented to allow fair competition 
between ridesharing and the taxi industry. As the number of drivers continues to increase, the price of a taxi 
medallion will still decrease but not as rapidly because a relatively stable equilibrium or maximum impact from 
Uber drivers will have been reached.  
7 
 
RESULTS  
NEW YORK 
FIGURE 2: NEW YORK CITY REGRESSION TABLE 
 
VARIABLES 
The results for New York City show that all variables but long term interest rate are statistically significant at the 
tested 95% confidence level, and even significant to the 99.9% confidence level. The null hypothesis H0 is rejected, 
and the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted for all independent variables except long term interest rate, 
concluding that these variables are statistically significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion.  
Additionally, each independent variable has a strong enough magnitude to deem them all economically significant. 
The price of a taxi medallion in New York City increases by $1.57 for each additional individual that joins the 
laborforce. Each additional 1% increase in unemployment rate decreases the price of a taxi medallion in New York 
City by $104,546.2. The price of a taxi medallion in New York City decreases by $30.32 for every additional Uber 
driver that is active in a given month. The magnitude of ltintrate intuitively does not make sense. A positive 
coefficient means that as the interest rate increases, the price of a taxi medallion will increase. However, as 
interest rates increase, the cost of borrowing increases, which should cause a negative relationship with the price 
of a taxi medallion. However, since ltintrate is not statistically significant, the positive sign on this variable is not 
concerning. Given that ltintrate is not statistically significant could imply that New York City’s taxi medallion prices 
are more determined by local determining factors, not nationwide economic health factors. 
Past research for New York City found that only unemrate was statistically significant in determining the value of a 
taxi medallion in New York City (Cumming, 2009). The other variables used in Cumming’s regression that were not 
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statistically significant were stock price index, interest rates and population (Cumming, 2009). These results are 
consistent with Cumming’s findings that unemrate is statistically significant and ltintrate is not.  
MODEL 
The R2 for this regression is 0.749, showing that this model is very effective at explaining the variation in taxi 
medallion prices in New York City. However, this also means that roughly 25% of taxi medallion value variation that 
is not explained, meaning other independent variables could explain the changes in taxi medallion value. The lower 
than expected R2 could also be due to the fact that Uber is still very new in the market, and people are unsure how 
to react to this new threat. When a disruption like this occurs, there is a probability that it could overtake the older 
technology, in this case the taxi industry, and also a probability that regulation will prevent the new service, Uber, 
from operating in the long term. This uncertainty leaves some people debating the impact of Uber’s long term 
presence when making a taxi medallion purchase price decision. This could also be attributed to random variation 
and the imperfect Uber driver data that was retrieved, given that this data is not widely available. 
CHICAGO 
FIGURE 3: CHICAGO REGRESSION TABLE 
 
VARIABLES 
The results for Chicago show that all variables are statistically significant at both the tested 95% confidence level 
and the 99.9% confidence level. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted concluding that all variables are statistically significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion. 
All independent variables have the expected positive or negative effect on taxi medallion prices, and are 
economically significant. The price of a taxi medallion in Chicago will decrease by $21.93 for every additional Uber 
driver. An increase in the unemployment rate of 1% will decrease the price of a taxi medallion in Chicago by 
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$48,615.0. A 1% increase in the long term interest rate will decrease the price of a taxi medallion in Chicago by 
$30,158.9. Each additional individual that joins the laborforce increases the price of a taxi medallion in Chicago by 
$1.22.  
Past research finds that only unemrate was statistically significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion 
(Cumming, 2009), however these results show all independent variables used are statistically significant in 
determining the price of a taxi medallion in Chicago. The variables used in Cumming’s regression that were not 
statistically significant were stock price index, interest rates and population (Cumming, 2009). The consistent 
finding is that unemrate is statistically significant, and what is different from Cumming’s results is that in this study 
laborforce and ltintrate are significant in determining the price of a taxi medallion. These differences could be due 
to monthly data used instead of annual figures or the time frame that was analyzed. 
The difference between Chicago’s statistical significance of ltintrate and New York City’s ltintrate could suggest 
that New York City is not as sensitive to nation-wide economic health conditions as Chicago. New York City could 
be highly dependent on the local economy, which is possible given the population size is larger than some 
countries. 
MODEL 
The R2 for this regression is 0.830, demonstrating that this model is very effective at explaining the variation in taxi 
medallion prices in Chicago. However, similarly to New York City, this means there is an unexplained variance in 
this model of nearly 17%. The lower than expected R2 could also be due to same reason provided in New York 
City’s case.  
PHILADELPHIA 
FIGURE 4: PHILADELPHIA REGRESSION TABLE 
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VARIABLES 
The results for Philadelphia illustrate that all variables are statistically significant at the tested 95% confidence 
level, and all but uberdriv are significant even to the 99.9% confidence level, with uberdriv significant to the 99% 
confidence level. Therefore, the null hypothesis H0 is rejected for all independent variables and the alternative 
hypothesis H1 is accepted, concluding that all variables are statistically significant in determining the value of a taxi 
medallion. 
All independent variables have the expected positive or negative effect on taxi medallion prices and have a strong 
enough magnitude to be economically significant. The price of a taxi medallion in Philadelphia will decrease by 
$44.66 for every additional Uber driver that is active in a given month. The results are surprising given that the 
magnitude is larger than New York City and Chicago, however there appears to be less of a decline in taxi 
medallion prices in Philadelphia compared to New York City and Chicago. An increase in the unemployment rate of 
1% will decrease the price of a taxi medallion in Philadelphia by $79,462.1. A 1% increase in the long term interest 
rate will decrease the price of a taxi medallion in Philadelphia by $34,358.5. Each additional individual that joins 
the laborforce in Philadelphia increases the price of a taxi medallion by $1.56.  
These relationships are consistent with the relationships discovered in Chicago. The variable unemrate is 
statistically significant, and ltintrate and laborforce are statistically significant unlike in Cumming’s research. 
MODEL 
The R2 for this regression is 0.896, showing that this model is extremely effective at explaining the variation in taxi 
medallion prices in Philadelphia. However, similarly to the other two cities, there is unexplained variance, but only 
approximately 10%.  
FIXED EFFECTS 
FIGURE 5: AGGREGATE FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION TABLE 
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VARIABLES 
The fixed effects regression analysis using the data as a panel shows similar results as before. All variables except 
ltintrate are statistically significant at the tested 95% confidence level, with significant independent variables 
significant to the 99.9% confidence level. For these independent variables, the null hypothesis H0 is rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted concluding that the variable is statistically significant in determining the 
value of a taxi medallion. The variable ltintrate is statistically significant at a 90% confidence level, which still shows 
this variable is effective at determining the price of a taxi medallion. 
In this panel analysis, all independent variables have the expected positive or negative effect on taxi medallion 
prices. Additionally, each statistically significant independent variable has a strong enough magnitude to be 
economically significant. For every additional Uber driver that is active in a given month, the price of a taxi 
medallion will decrease by $24.87. An increase in the unemployment rate of 1% will decrease the price of a taxi 
medallion by $5,933.2. For each additional individual that joins the laborforce, the price of a taxi medallion will 
increase by $1.55.  
MODEL 
The R2 for this regression is 0.703, showing that this model is very effective at explaining the variation in taxi 
medallion prices. However, similar to the previous models, this means there is unexplained variance in this model 
of nearly 30%. The lower than expected R2 could also be due to same reason that was explained in the individual 
city models, and also because the scale of these three cities are much different. New York City’s labor force 
population is more than double both Chicago’s and Philadelphia’s, which can cause difficulties in modeling given 
the difference in scale. 
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TESTING FOR NON-LINEARITY 
FIGURE 6: NON-LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
The regression results leave the linearity of this relationship up for debate. Firstly, it is clear that sqrtuber is not 
correct with a positive coefficient, removing Panel 3 as a possibility of non-linearity. The regression including 
sqruberdriv shows this variable to be statistically significant to the 99% confidence level. However, in the linear 
model, the variable uberdriv is statistically significant to the 99.9% confidence level. Both models are nearly equal 
in explaining the variation, with R2 values of 0.70 and 0.71. The AIC values are also nearly equal with a difference of 
only 0.1%. These results are inconclusive in regards to the relationship between the number of Uber drivers and 
the price of a taxi medallion is linear or non-linear, as both methodologies result in nearly identical statistical 
significance and R2 values. For simplicity and consistency, conclusions will be made with regard to a linear 
relationship. 
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COMPARING MODELS 
FIGURE 7: MODEL COMPARISON REGRESSION TABLE 
 
Across all models the variable of interest, uberdriv, remains statistically significant at a minimum confidence level 
of 99%, and shows a consistent negative coefficient with an economically significant magnitude.  
The magnitude of laborforce remains fairly constant across models ranging from 1.263 to 1.591. The magnitude of 
numdrivers is also fairly constant ranging from -24.093 to -30.268. The magnitude of unemrate has much more 
variation, ranging from a low magnitude in Chicago of -61,109.811 to a high magnitude in New York City of 
-116,769.203. This difference is likely attributed to the fact that the scale of New York City is much larger than 
Chicago. With New York City’s labor force population size roughly double Chicago’s, it makes sense that the 
magnitude of a 1% change in unemployment rate would be nearly twice as large in New York City compared to 
Chicago. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The number of active Uber drivers in a city is statistically and economically significant in determining the value of a 
taxi medallion in New York City, Chicago and Philadelphia. The higher the number of active Uber drivers in a city, 
the lower the value of a taxi medallion. This research shows that “The Uber Effect” is: For each additional active 
Uber driver, the price of a taxi medallion will decrease by $22 to $45. These results suggest that Uber’s recent 
entry has contributed to the dropping taxi medallion values across multiple cities, and it can be expected that 
these medallion values will continue to drop as Uber grows in these markets. 
In addition to the number of active Uber drivers, both labor force population and unemployment rate are 
statistically and economically significant in determining the value of a taxi medallion. Using these three variables is 
an effective way to predict the price of a taxi medallion. These findings are not entirely consistent with the past 
literature. Cumming’s concluded that only unemployment rate was significant in determining the price of a taxi 
medallion. These differences could be attributed to either the different time period of the study, or using monthly 
data instead of annual data. 
It is not certain whether the effect of the number of Uber drivers on taxi medallion prices is linear or non-linear. It 
is likely that this result is dependent on where Uber is in the lifecycle of entering a city. If this study was repeated a 
decade in the future, it is likely that the relationship would be non-linear, showing that the amount that taxi 
medallion prices decrease by is decreasing as the number of Uber drivers increases. However, the results in this 
analysis show that the negative linear effect is highly statistically and economically significant in the given time 
period. 
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EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT 1: DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY AVERAGE TAXI MEDALLION PRICES  
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PHILADELPHIA 
 
 
EXHIBIT 2: AVERAGE PRICE OF A TAXI MEDALLION OVER TIME 
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CHICAGO 
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EXHIBIT 3: NUMBER OF ACTIVE UBER DRIVERS OVER TIME  
 
EXHIBIT 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
NEW YORK CITY DATA  
 valmed uberdriv unemrate ltintrate laborforce 
Mean 766,153 2,056 8.43 2.62 6,940,198 
Maxima 1,145,455 15,913 9.70 3.85 7,079,321 
Minima 564,532 0 6.10 1.53 6,825,891 
Std Dev 142317 3728.21 1.04 0.66 76115 
 
CHICAGO DATA  
 valmed uberdriv unemrate ltintrate laborforce 
Mean 265,052 1,514 9.30 2.62 3,776,527 
Maxima 357,600 12,937 11.40 3.85 3,814,046 
Minima 161,994 0 6.10 1.53 3,722,701 
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Std Dev 72223 3059.96 1.44 0.66 25798 
 
PHILADELPHIA DATA 
 valmed uberdriv unemrate ltintrate laborforce 
Mean 351,774 210 7.90 2.62 3,026,942 
Maxima 515,000 2,444 9.10 3.85 3,064,906 
Minima 175,313 0 5.50 1.53 2,961,984 
Std Dev 96370 452.56 1.06 0.66 20235 
 
AGGREGATE DATA 
 valmed uberdriv unemrate ltintrate laborforce 
Mean 460,993 1,260 8.58 2.62 4,581,026 
Maxima 1,145,455 15,913 11.40 3.85 7,079,321 
Minima 161,994 0 5.60 1.53 2,961,984 
Std Dev 243,722 2,902.26 1.26 0.66 1,696,741 
 
EXHIBIT 5: DICKEY FULLER UNIT ROOT TESTS 
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